This is important in the 21st century since the clear lines of dominance between the Soviet and American spheres of influence no longer exist, and more and more conflicts focus more on terrorist or other sectarian groups with no national power, but funds and some level of popular support. It is a method of warfare that is counter-intuitive to the United States, yet addressing it is critical (Counterinsurgency Operations, 2009). BACKGROUND: Until the fall of the Soviet Union, political and military conflicts were drawn between the lines of capitalism and communism. While both sides aggressively supported their own agendas by funding appropriately placed groups in the developing world, the definition of friend or foe was easier to grasp. Particularly after 9/11, however, the face of the "enemy" has changed from political to a variety of cultural, religious, territorial, social, and even historical conflicts in which not only have tactics changed, but the dramatic evolution of technology has changed the level of the playing field.

DISCUSSION -- Typically, there are four elements that form the overall rubric of an insurgency: 1) secret cell-networks, often operating globally; 2) terrorism used to foster insecurity among the civilian population; 3) new and creative means designed to foster support within civilian (local and international) populations; 4) attacks against the government, or governments (Metz and Millen, 2004).

Because these practices are so endemic, the United States must change its overall strategy towards international conflict, its methods of collecting and analyzing data, and most importantly, the response necessary to form what many call "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency" (Sepp, 2005). One particular paradigm shift within military thinking is changing the way battles become numerous skirmishes as opposed to more formal, all-out battles. Additionally, the focus is more...

Almost a decade of study and debate, however, has resulted in an official U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, whose major purpose is to help understand the major philosophies surrounding the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and become better prepared for the number of additional potential 9/11s that could occur. This guide is also a game plan of sorts that helps interagency cooperation by establishing a way for different agencies, all with different needs, needs, budgets, and authority, to pull resources together to efficaciously offer timely and positive solutions (Bureau, 2009).
REFERENCES

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State. (January 2009).

U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office.

Jardine, E. (2009). "Why Time Works Against a Counterinsurgency." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. 11 (4): 1-33.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (October 5, 2009). Counterinsurgency Operations,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Metz, S. And R. Millen. (November 2004). "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and response." Cited in:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

Strategic Studies Institute Home. Sepp, K. (2005). "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review. Cited in:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf

This direct superseded presidential Directive NSC 56 of May, 1997, "Managing Complex Operations."